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Section 3142(e) of the 1984 Bail Reform
Act: Rebuttable Presumption or Mandatory
Detention?
Once the thumbscrew and the following confession made conviction easy; but that
method was crude and, I suppose, now would be declared unlawful upon some
ground. Hereafter, presumption is to lighten the burden of the prosecutor. The vic-
tim will be spared the trouble of confessing and will go to his cell without mutilation
or disquieting outcry.1
I. INTRODUCTION
C ongress enacted the Bail Reform Act of 19842 in response to
a perceived growth in the problem of criminal activity by per-
sons on pretrial release.$ A primary goal of the Act was to address
this problem by allowing the judicial officer responsible for setting
bail in federal courts to consider community safety when setting
release conditions or, if it appears that no conditions of release
will assure the safety of the community, to order pretrial preven-
tive detention of the defendant. In order to achieve this goal, the
1984 Act changed existing bail law in three major areas: (1) it
strictly prohibits the use of high money bail as a pretext for deten-
tioii and in its place provides a list of increasingly restrictive re-
lease conditions; 4 (2) it allows, in addition to the traditional bail
1. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 84 n.11 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting
Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 420 (1928) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)).
2. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141-50 (Supp. III 1985) (one of the numer-
ous sections of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984
US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3185.
3. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6-7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3815, 3188-90 [hereinafter 1984 S. REP.]; S. REP. No. 147, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 S. REs'.] ("The federal bail law must address the
alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release and must give the court ade-
quate authority to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a
person may pose to others if released."). Cases acknowledging this congressional intent
include United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 383-84 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 204-06 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d
329, 331 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (N.D. Cal.
1985).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a), (b), (c)(2)(A)-(N); see 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 13-16, 1984
693
694 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
concerns of risk of flight and jury or witness tampering, consider-
ation of the danger posed to the community by the defendant;'
and (3) it establishes a rebuttable presumption that a defendant
who falls within specified categories should be detained prior to
trial.' Many other changes in the 1984 Act also serve to allow pre-
trial detention in situations where it would not have been allowed
under previous law.7 These changes represent a fundamental shift
in the American attitude toward the function of bail.8
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3195-99.
5. Under the 1984 Act, "preventive detention" is authorized when there is a showing
that the defendant is "dangerous." An individual is deemed dangerous if "no condition or
combination of conditions [that can be placed on release] will reasonably assure .. . the
safety of any other person and the community ...." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); see 1984 S, REP.,
supra note 3, at 7, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3189-90; 1983 S. REP., supra
note 3, at 12; cf Bail Reform Act of 1966, H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. 6,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2293, 2296 ("[U]nder American criminal
jurisprudence pretrial bail may not be used as a device to protect society from possible
commission of additional crimes by the accused.").
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); see 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 19-20, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 3202-03.
7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (permits rejection of bail money if its source is illegal
income); id. § 3148 (provides procedures for revoking release of defendant who has vio-
lated conditions of release); id. § 3142(d) (allows temporary detention by judiciary pending
revocation of release order, deportation, or exclusion). Before the passage of the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (98 Stat.) 3185, theJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, appears to have guaran-
teed the right to release on bail to all persons charged with a noncapital federal crime. See
Ervin, Preventive Detention, A Species of Lydjord Law, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 115 (1983).
8. "[O]ur system of criminal justice... has operated on the premise that crime should
normally be prevented by the threat of subsequent punishment rather than the imposition
of prior imprisonment." Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John
Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 375 (1970); see also United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790
F.2d 984, 1004 (2d Cir. 1986) (it is a "fundamental principle that detention to prevent the
commission of domestic crime can constitutionally occur only after conviction"); United
States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that new Bail Reform Act
drastically changes prior law by including dangerousness as factor to be considered in de-
termining conditions of pretrial release); United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th Cir.
1985) (noting major difference brought about by new Bail Reform Act is authorization to
consider dangerousness in decision whether to release on conditions or detain); United
States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780, 785 (E.D.N.Y.) ("[A] long period of preventive de-
tention without a finding of guilt, based solely on possible danger to the public, is 'anath-
ema to American ideals of due process.' "), rev'd, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985); R.B. McNA-
MARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135 (1982) (preventive detention is
contrary to due process); Borman, The Selling of Preventive Detention 1970, 65 Nw. U. L. REv.
879, 880 (1971) (permitting detention without proof of guilt "offends values which are at
the very heart of our criminal justice system"); Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to
Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329 (1982) (arguing that right to bail
has developed into "fundamental principle of American criminal jurisprudence"); Coin-
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Prior to the 1984 Act, denial of bail was perceived as a mech-
anism for preserving the integrity of the trial process. Thus, the
law required that the goal of a judicial officer in setting bail was to
ensure that the defendant would be available for trial and to en-
sure that the defendant could not improperly influence the out-
come of the trial.' Today, under the modified Act, bail may be
denied in order to protect the community against potential
criminals.10 A defendant may be denied release, in the absence of
a conviction for the crime charged, if the judicial officer believes
that the defendant is likely to commit "another crime"1' while on
release during the pretrial period. This system contains an inher-
ent threat to every citizen. If you are suspected of participation in
enumerated drug offenses, "[e]ven if you have never been
charged or convicted of any offense, you [will likely] be jailed ...
as a criminal menace to public safety.1
12
Despite this anticipatory approach, the 1984 Act has with-
stood all but one constitutional attack in federal court.1 3 The
ment, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 225 (1985) (noting that preventive detention for dangerousness is funda-
mental change in American bail administration).
9. Prior to the 1984 Act, a court could detain a defendant for two reasons: to prevent
the accused from fleeing prior to trial and/or to prevent the accused from tampering with
the jury or witnesses. See, e.g. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 997-98 (2d
Cir. 1986); United States v. Wind, 527 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gilbert,
425 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Mfastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 965 (1964); State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 373, 164 A.2d 740, 743 (1960),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Engle, 99 N.J. 453, 493 A.2d 1217 (1985). Recent cases
indicate that the rule continues in effect under the 1984 Act. See, e.g., United States v.
Payden, 768 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501,
507 n.7 (D.P.R. 1984), affid, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985).
10. Paradoxically, preventive detiention requires a predition that a defendant who has
yet to be proven guilty of the crime for which he is held has a potential for committing
"additional" crime. See generally 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 9-13, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 3202-03 (discussing committee's belief that judges can make such predic-
tions with an acceptable level of accuracy).
11. Congress describes the need for detaining individuals charged with narcotics
crimes due to the significant risk of pretrial recidivism, 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 20,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3203, yet there is no distinction in the statutory
language or legislative history between defendants who have been convicted of previous
crimes, recidivists, and those who are under indictment for the first time.
12. Tribe, supra note 8, at 392.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 1985) ("We join all
the other courts in the country that have either implicitly or explicitly held that the Bail
Reform Act does not violate the fifth or eighth amendment. No court has held the Act
unconstitutional."); United States v. Powell, 761 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (post-
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lower federal courts have disagreed on the appropriate interpreta-
tion of various procedural portions of the Act. They have, how-
ever, been unanimous in accepting the constitutional authority of
Congress to define nonbailable offenses and to delineate the rele-
vant considerations for determining bail. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the 1984 Bail
Act.1
4
This Comment reviews the constitutionality of one major pro-
cedural change wrought by the 1984 Act-the rebuttable pre-
sumption favoring detention. The propriety of preventive deten-
tion itself is outside the scope of this Comment; this topic has
been debated at length by a number of scholars15 and has appar-
ently been accepted by the current Administration, 6 groups rep-
resenting disparate legal interests,17 and the federal courts.1 '
conviction release procedures held constitutional); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378
(Ist Cir. 1985) (congressional creation of rebuttable presumption of flight held not a denial
of liberty without due process); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1985)
(denial of bail held not punishment in violation of fifth amendment); United States v.
Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (1984 Act held not violative of ex post facto
clause, not unconstitutionally vague, not violative of excessive bail clause nor procedural
due process protections), rev'd on other grounds, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1985); United States
v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (procedural safeguards satisfy fifth amend-
ment due process requirements, and pretrial detention based on finding of dangerousness
does not violate fifth amendment's equal protection clause). But see United States v.
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986) (Newman, J., Feinberg, C.J., concurring in
result; Timbers, J., dissenting).
14. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 397 (1986).
In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of a New York State statute which used the same mechanism, preventive detention, as is
used in the 1984 Act. The decision was limited by the precise circumstances of the statute
at issue and, alone, is not dispositive of the 1984 Act's constitutionality. See infra text ac-
companying notes 77-83.
15. See Duker, Bail Reform for the Eighties: A Reply to Senator Kennedy, 49 FORDHAM L.
REV. 40 (1980); Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV. 33 (1977);
Ervin, supra note 7; Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: H, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
1125 (1965); Kennedy, A New Approach to Bail Release: The Proposed Federal Criminal Code
and Bail Reform, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 423 (1980); Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitution-
ality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969); Tribe, supra note 8; Note, supra note
8;.
16. 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3184-85.
(noting that President made major contributions to bill).
17. Id. at 5-6, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3188 (noting input of the
American Bar Association, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
National District Attorneys Association, and National Association of Pretrial Service Agen-
cies to bill).
18. See supra note 13.
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Nonetheless, allowance of preventive detention represents a dras-
tic change in our criminal justice system.19 This Comment con-
tends that if the American criminal justice system is to embrace
such a drastic change, then the vehicle for such a change should
ensure, at a minimum, that all persons accused receive equal treat-
ment under the system. The 1984 Bail Act must guarantee com-
pliance with the equal protection requirements of the
Constitution.
Part II of this Comment briefly examines the historical con-
text of preventive detention in the United States in order to
demonstrate the fundamental nature of the shift in American atti-
tudes toward bail as evidenced by the 1984 Bail Act. Part III
presents an overview of the procedural protections that the Act
provides to federal defendants. These procedures demonstrate
Congress' attempt to ensure that liberty would not suffer from un-
constitutional restrictions. Part IV considers the general role of
evidentiary presumptions in criminal proceedings and specifically
focuses on the judicial interpretation of the 1984 Bail Act's rebut-
table presumption regarding pretrial detention. This interpreta-
tion is critical to an understanding that, in practice, the proce-
dural protections provided by the Act are constitutionally
deficient. Finally, Part V outlines an equal protection analysis of
the Act's rebuttable presumption. This Comment concludes that
the evidentiary presumption in the 1984 Bail Act works to favor
pretrial detention of an accused based on the class of crime
charged, though not yet proven, rather than on an accused's indi-
vidual characteristics or potential for crime. As a result of this bias
toward pretrial detention for a particular class of defendants,
which is "[o]bviously ... a deprivation of liberty," 20 that class of
defendants is denied equal protection under the Act.
If the Supreme Court chooses to follow the trend in the lower
courts and uphold the constitutionality of preventive detention,
this Comment recommends that the Court should allow such de-
tention only after there has been a proper balancing of interests.
Whenever the government moves for detention of a defendant
without bail, due process requires that a judge balance the individ-
19. Congress recognized the radical and controversial change it was making. See 1984
S. REP., supra note 3, at 1-2, 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3184-85.
20. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 998 (2d Cir. 1986).
1986] 697
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ual defendant's interest in remaining at liberty prior to trial
against the relevant societal interests in crime prevention. 21 Under
the 1984 Bail Act, all federal defendants who are not accused of
committing a presumption-triggering crime are provided with
procedures that require such a balancing of interests in the bail
decision. There is no rational basis for Congress to single out cer-
tain accused individuals and to provide them with a separate stan-
dard of due process protection regardless of their personal charac-
teristics. Detainment of individuals, in response to societal outrage
at the heinousness of a particular type of crime, is better reserved
until after conviction.
II. 1984 BAIL REFORM ACT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Judicial Precedents for Adult Preventive Detention
In all of American constitutional jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court has only once upheld, in Korematsu v. United States,
the pretrial preventive detention of competent adults.2 In this
case, the Court upheld an order which allowed for the detention,
during World War II, of all Japanese Americans on the West
Coast in prison-like camps.23 Although the Court conceded that
this racially based segregation necessarily resulted in the preven-
tive detention of many individuals who were loyal to the United
States, the difficulty in bringing about an immediate segregation
of loyal from disloyal individuals was held to justify the indiscrimi-
21. Congress recognized that the pretrial detention provision of the 1984 Act "is in
no way a derogation of the importance of the defendant's interest in remaining at liberty
prior to trial. However, not only the interests of the defendant, but also important societal
interests are at issue in the pretrial release decision." 1984 S. REP, supra note 3, at 7, 1984
US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3189. The committee explicitly recognized that a pre-
trial detention statute would be "constitutionally defective if it fails to provide adequate
procedural safeguards or ... if it does not limit pretrial detention to cases in which it is
necessary ... to serve the societal interests it is designed to protect." Id. at 8, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3191. Cases have noted that without proper balancing of
interests, denial of bail is arbitrary and in violation of the eighth amendment. See, e.g.,
Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1162-63 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moore, 607 F.
Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
22. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (allowing civil
commitment of mentally ill persons who were deemed unable to care for themselves).
23. The dissent used the term "concentration camps" and emphasized that the term
was chosen specifically to raise the negative connotations traditionally attached. 323 U.S, at
226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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nate race-based detention.24
Korematsu emphasized that the purpose of the detention was
to protect against espionage and sabotage. 25 It was only this over-
whelming concern for national security, raised by "[n]othing short
of apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest
imminent danger to the public safety" 26 at a time when our shores
were threatened by hostile forces,2 7 that could constitutionally jus-
tify race-based detention. The limited holding of Korematsu illus-
trates a response to unprecedented and possibly unique circum-
stances in which a time of national emergency was thought to
justify total deprivation of the protected liberty of competent
adults.28
B. Legislative Precedents for Adult Preventive Detention
The impetus for congressional action to first provide courts
with the power to preventively detain defendants prior to an adju-
dication of guilt was efforts by the Nixon Administration. 29 The
result was a preventive detention statute for the District of
Columbia."0
With this D.C. statute, Congress sought to accomplish two
objectives by permitting pretrial detention of dangerous defend-
ants.3 1 First, Congress hoped to reduce the number of violent
crimes that were attributable to persons on pretrial release. Sec-
ond, they wished to eliminate a perceived hypocrisy in the existing
bail system. Although then existing bail laws prevented a judge
from using a defendant's potential dangerousness as a factor in
bail decisions, Congress believed that it was not realistic to expect
judges to follow the letter of a law that required them to turn
24. Id. at 218-19.
25. Id. at 218.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. It is likely that the Korematsu decision would not be valid law today. See United
States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1004 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Korematsu v. United
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984)).
29. See Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1223; Tribe, supra note 8.
30. The pretrial detention statute was part of the District of Columbia Court Reform
and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 642 (1970) (codi-
fied in scattered titles and sections of D.C. CODE ANN.).
31. See Comment, Preventive Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the In-
nocent, 82 AM. U.L. REv. 191, 192 n.15 (1982).
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many dangerous criminals loose day after day.,2 It was noted by
contemporary supporters of preventive detention that "only con-
fusion and dissatisfaction can result from attempting to twist the
bail system in order to prevent crime. So-called preventive deten-
tion should be dealt with openly and on its own merits, not
masked behind manipulations of bail amounts.133
It is likely that a third underlying reason contributed to the
enactment of the District of Columbia preventive detention stat-
ute. The Nixon Administration desired to create the impression
that it was taking substantial steps to restore safety to American
communities.3 ' Preventive detention may have been perceived as
a convenient mechanism that, regardless of its true effects, would
always appear to achieve the goal of crime prevention; for, pre-
dictably, no detained defendant could commit a crime during the
pretrial period.3 5 Judicial mistakes imposing detention on a de-
fendant who, in fact, would not have proved to be a bad bail risk
are impossible to count. Errors on the other side, however, where
a bailed defendant proves to be dangerous, are inevitably counted
in support of a system of pretrial detention. "
32. See Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966: Hearings on S. Res. 43 Before the Sub.
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 220-
21 (1969) (statement of Tim Murphy, Judge of the District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions).
33. ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRE-
TRIAL RELEASE 6 (Tent. Draft 1968).
34. Comment, supra note 31, at 193 n.15; see also Ervin, supra note 7 (documenting
Nixon's efforts to encode existing laws); Ervin, Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 288 (1971) (D.C. statute is result of politics, public fear, and hyste-
ria); Tribe, supra note 8 (District of Columbia statute is dangerous politically desirable pal-
liative). In a parody on President Nixon, an imaginary speech to the nation includes the
following mention of preventive detention:
[O]ne experiment we have tried with some success here in Washington is the
"Justice in the Streets Program." This is a program whereby sentencing and
punishment, for capital crimes as well as felonies and misdemeanors, is deliv-
ered on the spot at the very moment the crime is committed, or even appears to
have been committed. Through J.I.T.S.P. and related methods of expediting
the judicial process, we hope to be able not only to unclog the court calendars
but to wind down the whole trial system by Election Day 1972.
P. RomH, OuR GANG 101 (1971).
35. "Preventive detention plays a cruel hoax on the American people because it
promises safety and a decrease in crime which it cannot deliver." Ervin, supra note 34, at
298; see also Tribe, supra note 8, at V75. ("[lilt is an experiment that can only confirm and
never rebut the experimenter's hypothesis. . . .[W]hen the system detains persons who
could safely have been released, its errors will be invisible.").
36. Cf Foote, supra note 15, at 1172 (detained defendants who would not have been
1986] BAIL REFORM ACT 701
The constitutionality of this first congressional move toward
allowing pretrial preventive detention was addressed by the courts
in United States v. Edwards.3 7 In Edwards, a defendant charged with
armed rape posed a constitutional challenge to the D.C. preven-
tive detention statute on both substantive and procedural
grounds."' The majority of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals held: (1) that the history of the eighth amendment does not
establish a right to bail;"9 (2) that pretrial detention does not deny
due process because the underlying legislative purpose for deten-
tion is regulatory rather than penal in nature;40 and (3) that the
statute was neither impermissibly overbroad nor vague.4 The Su-
preme Court denied certiorari. 42
The legislative history of the 1984 Act makes it clear that the
98th Congress' goals were similar to those of the 91st Congress,
and, that the former relied heavily on the Edwards precedent.4
The 1984 Bail Act, however, contains two significant detention-
promoting changes from the D.C. statute upheld in Edwards.
First, the Act does not carry forward the specific limitation on the
length of the pretrial detention period.44 Second, section 3142(e)
bad risks cannot be identified and counted, but unnecessary detention inevitably occurs).
37. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
38. 430 A.2d at 1324-26.
39. Id. at 1327.
40. Id. at 1331-33. The distinction between penal detention and regulatory detention
is described in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). This distinction is drawn for purposes of a procedural due pro-
cess analysis to determine the level of procedural protections required by the Constitution
prior to imposition of sanctions under the statute. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-
14 (1975); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1985). This distinction
does not undermine the accepted notion that a fundamental liberty is affected by any form
of detention. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska, 442 U.S. 1 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1971).
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972), the Court recognized that even the
"qualified liberty" of a parolee contains the same core values as unqualified liberty. The
core values mentioned were the opportunity to prepare a defense, to get or maintain gain-
ful employment, to maintain family and social ties, and to maintain a community reputa-
tion. These are the fundamental rights at stake in both requlatory and penal detention. See
also Schall v. Martin 467 U.S. 253, 265, 269-74 (1984) (using penal-regulatory distinction
to review juvenile preventive detention statute under procedural due process requirements
in light of recognized individual liberty interest). For criticism of the Edwards penal-regula-
tory analysis, see Comment, supra note 31, at 203-07.
41. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1341-43.
42. 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
43. 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 8, 1984 US CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3190-91.
44. Id. at 22 n.63, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3205 n.63.
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of the Act4" represents a congressional determination that mem-
bers of a certain, identifiable group of accused criminals are far
more likely to violate the conditions of their release than are
members of other groups. Consequently, members of that identifi-
able group should bear a heavier burden of proving their eligibil-
ity for pretrial release .4  The D.C. statute does not include any
comparable evidentiary finding. Under that statute, the prosecu-
tion is required to present to the judicial decision maker individ-
ual-specific evidence in support of its request for preventive deten-
tion . 7 Nonetheless, the court of appeals decision in Edwards
remains the primary authority cited by federal courts when ac-
cepting the legitimacy of adult preventive detention and congres-
sional presumptions.48
In light of this similarity of goals and this reliance on judicial
precedents, it is useful to briefly review the key procedural provi-
sions of the District of Columbia Preventive Detention Statute in
order to construct a framework for comparison with the 1984 Bail
Reform Act.
Section 23-1321 of the District of Columbia Code49 allows for
judicial discretion to order the terms of a pretrial release of a de-
fendant who has not been charged with murder in the first de-
gree. 0 Such discretion entails choosing from among the particu-
lar terms and conditions of release listed in the section.5 1 The
statute describes five alternative or additional restrictions on re-
45. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 138-60 (describing judicial applicaiton of perti-
nent parts of 1984 Act).
47. See infra notes 56-62.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 387 (1st Cir. 1985); United States
v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Moore, 607 F.
Supp. 489, 493 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (N.D.
Cal. 1985); United States v. Kouymodjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (C.D. Cal. 1985),
United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 505-06, (D.P.R. 1984).
49. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
50. Bail has been denied to persons accused of capital crimes since the Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, Tribe describes the flight-based reasons for bail denial:
The underlying motive for denying bail in the prescribed type of capital of-
fenses is to assure the accused's presence at trial. In a choice between hazarding
his life before a jury and forfeiting his or his sureties' property, the framers of
the Constitution obviously reacted to man's undoubted urge to prefer the latter.
Tribe, supra note 8, at 377 n. 18 (quoting State v. Konigsburg, 33 N.J. 367, 373, 104
A.2d 740, 743 (1960) (emphasis in original).
51. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a)(1)-(5) (1981).
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lease that are available to a judicial officer when considering an
unsecured appearance bond. These restrictions are designed to
provide reasonable assurance that a defendant will appear at trial
and will not endanger any other person or the community while
at liberty prior to trial.52
Judicial discretion when ordering release is constrained by
three limitations. First, the restrictive conditions listed in the stat-
ute must be sequentially examined. Only the first condition, or
combination of conditions, that will reasonably assure the appear-
ance of the defendant or the safety of the community, will be in-
cluded in the release order.53 Second, a financial condition cannot
be imposed for the purpose of assuring the safety of any other
person or the community." Third, the primary factors to be con-
sidered in determining the appropriate conditions of release are
provided for in the statute.55
If release appears inappropriate, section 23-1322 of the D.C.
Code56 provides for the procedures and factors to be considered
before pretrial detention can be ordered. Subsection (a) sets forth
three separate categories of defendants who may be ordered de-
tained. The category into which a defendant falls depends upon
the type of crime charged. If a defendant is charged with a "dan-
gerous crime, '57 the government must present evidence that the
52. Id. § 23-1321(a).
53. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1489 (8th Cir. 1985) (four
judges dissenting); United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890-91 (8th Cir. 1985).
54. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1981).
55.
[T]hejudicial officer shall.., take into account such matters as the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against such
person, his family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental
conditions, past conduct, length of residence in the community, record of con-
victions, and any record of appearance at court proceedings, flight to avoid
prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings.
Id. § 23-1321(b).
56. Id. § 23-1322 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
57.
The term "dangerous crime" means (A) taking or attempting to take property
from another by force or threat of force, (B) unlawfully entering or attempting
to enter any premises adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for
carrying on business with the intent to commit an offense therein, (C) arson or
attempted arson of any premises adaptable for overnight accommodation of
persons or for carrying on business, (D) forcible rape, or assault with intent to
commit forcible rape, or (E) unlawful sale or distribution of a narcotic or de-
pressant or stimulant drug (as defined by any Act of Congress) if the offense is
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defendant has demonstrated a particularized pattern of dangerous
behavior. 58 If, however, a person is charged with a "crime of vio-
lence,"59 committed while on some form of judicial release, 0 or is
charged with attempting to destroy the integrity of the trial pro-
cess,"1 the government may rely on the factors usually considered
in a release decision. 2
Subsections (c), (d), and (e) of section 23-132263 outline the
procedures to be followed during a pretrial detention hearing.
These procedures delineate when, how, and by whom the hearing
may be initiated," the forms of admissible evidence at the hear-
ing, 5 the defendant's right to present evidence, "6 and the setting
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
Id. § 23-1331(3) (1981).
58. "[A] judicial officer may order pretrial detention ... if the Government certifies
by motion that based on such person's pattern of behavior consisting of his past and pre-
sent conduct ...." Id. § 23-1322(a)(1).
59.
The term "crime of violence" means murder, forcible rape, carnal knowledge
of a female under the age of sixteen, taking or attempting to take immoral,
improper, or indecent liberties with a child under the age of sixteen years, may-
hem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, voluntary' manslaughter, extortion or
blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, arson, assault with intent to com-
mit any offense, assault with a dangerous weapon, or an attempt or conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing offenses as defined by any Act of Congress or
any State law, if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year.
Id. § 23-1331(4).
60. "[B]ail or other release or on probation, parole, or mandatory release pending
completion of a sentence." Id. § 23-1322(a)(2)(ii).
61. "[A] person charged with any offense if such person, for the purpose of ob-
structing or attempting to obstruct justice, threatens, injures, intimidates, or attempts to
threaten, injure or intimidate any prospective witness or juror." Id. § 23-1322(a)(3).
62. Id. § 23-1322(b); cf cases cited supra, note 9 (demonstrating traditional reasons for
denial of bail).
63. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(c), (d), (e) (1981 & Supp. 1986).
64. Id. § 23-1322(c)(1), (2) (1981) (allows government attorney to initiate detention
hearing); id. § 23-1322(e) (1981 & Supp. 1986) (amended 1982) (allows judicial officer to
detain for short period if it appears that person is presently on release); id. § 23-1322()
(Supp. 1986) (added 1982) (permits detention of person charged with commission of dan-
gerous crime or crime of violence when on bond if probable cause found).
65. "Information stated in, or offered in connection with, any Order entered pursuant
to this Section need not conform to the rules pertaining to the admissibility of evidence in
a court of law." Id. § 23-1322(c)(5) (1981).
66. "The person shall be entitled to representation by counsel and shall be entitled to
present information by proffer or otherwise, testify, and to present witnesses in his own
behalf." Id. § 23-1322(c)(4).
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of the trial date.6 7
Subsection (b) of section 23-132211 requires that the deten-
tion order include written findings of fact stating: (1) that there is
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant belongs in one
of the three categories described by subsection (a); 9 (2) that in the
case of each category of defendants, and, based upon on the con-
siderations required by the category, there are no conditions of
release which will reasonably assure the safety of the commu-
nity;70 and, (3) that there is a substantial probability that the per-
son charged with a crime, in either of the first two categories of
detainable crimes, has committed the offense as charged.7 1 An or-
der of pretrial detention is then subject to a fixed time limit. At
the time of the Edwards decision, the maximum period of deten-
tion was sixty days, unless the trial was in progress or had been
delayed at the request of the detainee.7 1 Under the District of Co-
lumbia preventive detention scheme there are no periods of ex-
cludable time. In sustaining the statute, the Edwards court made
particular reference to this time requirement, commenting: "Sig-
nificantly, pretrial detention is closely circumscribed so as not to
go beyond the need to protect the safety of the community. 7 8
In sum, the District of Columbia Preventive Detention Stat-
ute provides for a scheme that prefers the release of defendants
during the pretrial period. However, it allows detention during
that period only if strictly limited in length and if, after an indi-
vidualized hearing, the decision to detain is based on a demonstra-
ble need to detain.
67. "The case of such person shall be placed on an expedited calendar and . .. his
trial shall be given priority." Id. § 23-1322(d)(1)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1986). "Notwithstanding
the sixty day calendar provision, any such person may be detained for an additional period
not to exceed thirty days ...." Id. § 23-1322(d)(4) (Supp. 1986) (added 1986).
68. Id. § 23-1322(b)(1981).
69. Id. § 23-1322(b)(2)(A).
70. Id. § 23-1322(b)(2)(B).
71. Id. § 23-1322(b)(2)(C).
72. Id. § 23-1322(d)(2)(A). The maximum time has been extended from sixty to ninety
days for some cases. Id. § 23-1322(d)(4) (Supp. 1986) (added 1982).
73. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1333.
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C. Precedents for Preventive Detention of Juveniles
In Schall v. Martin,74 the constitutionality of a New York
statute which permitted family court judges to detain alleged juve-
nile delinquents prior to a fact-finding hearing was at issue. Deten-
tion under the New York statute could be ordered prior to a hear-
ing on the truth of the allegations if the arraigning court
determined that there was a serious risk that the juvenile would
commit a crime during the pretrial period.7 5 The United States
Supreme Court found the statute acceptable under the require-
ments of the due process clause because "preventive detention
under the Family Court Act serves a legitimate state objective and
the procedural protections afforded pretrial detainees ... [are sat-
isfactory]. ' 17 6 In reaching this judgment, the majority emphasized
the regulatory, non-penal nature of pretrial custody, the strictly
limited length of detention under the statute, the New York Leg-
islature's intent to protect the juvenile defendants from them-
selves, and the unique status of juveniles who, unlike adults, are
assumed to be subject to custodial control at all times.7 The ma-
jority noted further that the concept of detention prior to a fact-
finding hearing itself was not inherently objectionable. Despite
the apparent contradiction between pretrial detention and the
due process requirement that a finding of guilt precede detention,
the court held that "from a legal point of view there is nothing
inherently unobtainable about a prediction of future criminal con-
duct. Such a judgment forms an important element in many [of
our] decisions." '7 8
The rationale in Schall leaves open two crucial questions re-
garding the constitutionality of the 1984 Bail Act: whether the
considerations justifying preventive detention of juveniles apply
equally to adults and whether the specific statutory limit on the
length of permissible pretrial detention is a significant factor in
the constitutionality of the statute?7 ' Nevertheless, Schall, like Ed-
74. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2406.
77. Id. at 2414-15.
78. Id. at 2417-18.
79. See generally Ewing, Schall v. Martin: Preventive Detention and Dangerousness
Through the Looking Glass, 34 BuFFALO L. REv. 173, 225-26 (1985) (analyzing lack of statisti-
cal validity in majority's acceptance of judges' ability to make reliable predictions).
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wards, was relied on by Congress and a number of federal courts
in finding the 1984 Bail Act constitutional."0
III. PROVISIONS OF THE 1984 BAIL REFORM ACT
This overview of the provisions of the 1984 Bail Act will
demonstrate the close parallels to the District of Columbia Bail
Act.
Section 3142(a), (b), and (c) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
set out the situations for the release of a defendant prior to trial
and the conditions that may be imposed upon a release.8 ' Condi-
tions are imposed when a judicial officer determines that they are
necessary to assure appearance or to protect the safety of any
other person or the community.8 These conditions for release are
far more detailed than those provided by the D.C. statute.83 The
federal statute includes many of the conditions for release that
have been developed for various state release statutes.8 It empha-
sizes that the "least restrictive further condition should be all that
is imposed on a released person."85
The final sentence of subsection (c) stresses that a judicial of-
ficer may not impose a financial condition upon an individual that
results in that individual's pretrial detention.86 This limitation is a
carryover from the 1966 Bail Reform Act8 7 that deemphasized
the use of money bonds due to a perception that such bonds re-
sulted in a disproportionate number of unnecessary pretrial incar-
cerations of poor defendants.88 This limitation thereby reinforces
80. See, e.g., United States v. Acceturo, 783 F.2d 382, 394 (3d Cir. 1986); United
States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598
F. Supp. 1442, 1452 (N.D. I1. 1984); United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388, 1391,
1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 506 (D.P.R.
1984), af'd, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985).
81. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (Supp. 1984) (release on recogni-
zance or bond); id. § 3142(c)(2), (A)-(N) (release on conditions).
82. Id. § 3142(c).
83. See supra notes 51-54.
84. See P. WICE, BAIL AND ITs REFORM: A NATIONAL SURVEY (1974).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2).
86. Id. § 3142(e); cf. District of Columbia Statute, as discussed supra note 53 and ac-
companying text.
87. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (1966) (enacted sec-
tions 3146 to 3152; amended sections 3041, 3141 to 3143, and 3568 of Title 18).
88. See 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3187-
88. ("[The 1966 Bail Reform Act] was to deemphasize the use of money bonds . . . a
practice which was perceived as resulting in unnecessary pretrial incarceration of poor de-
1986] 707
708 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
the statute's preference for release.89
If the judicial officer feels no conditions of release are suffi-
cient to reasonably assure the defendant's presence and to prevent
pretrial recidivism, a detention hearing must be held. In order to
detain a defendant pursuant to this hearing, the judicial officer
must submit written findings of fact 0 supporting the conclusion
that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will
reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant and the safety
of the community. 1 The detention hearing may be triggered by
the government in a case which involves a crime of violence, an
offense punishable by a maximum sentence of life imprisonment
or death, a narcotics-related crime punishable by a maximum
prison term of ten or more years, or any felony committed by a
person with two or more convictions for offenses which fall within
the categories just described. 92 The government or the judicial of-
ficer in charge may also trigger a detention hearing in a case that
involves the traditional integrity of the trial process bail con-
cerns.9 3 Regardless of who triggers the detention hearing, the
statutory procedures for the hearing will be identical. 4 Subsec-
tions (e) through () of section 3142 describe the evidentiary and
fendants . (quoting UNTIED STATES ATTORNEY GEN., TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME
FINAL REPORT 50 (1981))); see also Ervin, supra note 7, at 113 (1966 Bail Reform Act made
right to pretrial release a reality even for poor people unable to give monetary bail).
89. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (emphasizing that only least restrictive conditions
of release should be imposed); 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 6-7, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3188-90 (emphasizing that conditions of release may reduce pretrial recidi-
vism for all but a limited group); id. at 13, 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3189
(suggested conditions for release in statute are relevant to question of danger as well as
flight and are spelled out in detail to encourage courts to utilize them). For cases recogniz-
ing the preference for release, see, for example, United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d
246, 251 (2d Cir. 1986) (must consider all circumstances regarding release conditions; bail
should be denied only in rare cases of extreme and unusual circumstances.); United States
v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (1984 Act continues to mandate release
under least restrictive conditions available); United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890 (8th
Cir. 1985) (1984 Act's statutory scheme continues to favor release over detention); United
States v. Botero, 604 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (detention is not ordered under
the 1984 Act unless it is "only" way to meet purposes of Act); United States v. Acevedo-
Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 510 (D.P.R.) (emphasizing detention should be ordered only in
exceptonal circumstances), affd 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).
91. Id. § 3142(e).
92. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(A)-(D).
93. Id. § 3142()(2)(A), (B) (risk of flight or jury or witness tampering); see also supra
note 9 (discussing traditional reasons for detention).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0.
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procedural requirements of a detention hearing.95
When a detention hearing is triggered by the government in
cases involving the crimes enumerated by the Act,96 two rebutta-
ble evidentiary presumptions in favor of detention may arise.97
The judicial officer must consider the applicable presumptions,
along with the characteristics of the offense and the offender, as
set forth in subparagraph (a).98These presumptions represent the
result of a fact-finding by Congress that there is a "small but iden-
tifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants, as to whom
neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the
prospect of revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety
of the community."' 9 Congress noted that this group particularly
included defendants charged with narcotics offenses as "[i]t is well
known that drug trafficking is carried on to an unusual degree by
persons engaged in continuing patterns of criminal activity. Per-
sons charged with major drug felonies are often in the business of
importing or distributing dangerous drugs.., they pose a signifi-
cant risk of pretrial recidivism." 100
The first presumption arises against a defendant who pos-
sesses the characteristics that Congress has determined identify
members of a particularly dangerous group.101 An individual will
be treated as a member of a dangerous group if three conditions
are present: (1) the defendant was previously convicted for an of-
95. Id. § 3142 (e)-j).
96.
[A] crime of violence . . . (B) an offense for which the maximum term of im-
prisonment of ten years or more as prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act
[21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1982)], the Controlled Substances Import and Export
Act [21 U.S.C. §§ 951-970 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)], or (D) any felony commit-
ted after the person has been convicted of two or more prior offenses described
in subparagraphs (A) through (C) ....
Id. § 3142(0(1)(A).
97. Id. § 3142(e).
98. The statute specifies that the judicial officer must take into account such factors as:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a
crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug; (2) the weight of the evidence; (3) the history
and personal characteristics of the individual; (4) the nature of danger posed by release;
and (5) the source of property offered as security. Id. § 3142(g).
99. 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 6-7, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3188-
90.
100. Id. at 20, 1984 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3203.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); see also supra note 95 and accompanying text (crime
charged may bring a defendant within the parameters of class).
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fense as serious as the offenses listed in the statute as justifications
for a pretrial detention hearing;10 2 (2) the previous offense was
committed while the defendant was at liberty pending a criminal
trial;103 and (3) no more than five years have passed since the lat-
ter of conviction or release from prison for the previous of-
fense.110 It is important to note that the presumption here arises
directly from a proven fact. The "predictor" is a past conviction
for pretrial recidivism, an act that is precisely the type of act the
statute is designed to prevent.1 0 5 This presents a rational basis for
separate statutory treatment of this group.
The second presumption arises against a defendant based
merely on the nature of the crime currently charged.106 For ex-
ample, a defendant who has no previous conviction record but is
now charged with a serious narcotics crime is presumed so likely
to commit another crime that denial of pretrial release is war-
ranted.10 7 This second presumption arises as the result of proof as
to guilt of the crime currently charged rather than proof of previ-
ous recidivism. 1  The reliability of such a prediction is far more
tenuous than that involved in the first presumption.0 Such a ten-
uous inference from an as yet unproven fact is a questionable basis
for imposing an additional burden on a defendant to prove that
release is nonetheless justified.110
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).
103. Id. § 3142(e)(2).
104. Id. § 3142(e)(3).
105. See 1984 S. RE!P., supra note 3, at 3, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3185
(noting that changes to Bail Act reflect goal of using federal bail laws to address "alarming
problem of crimes committed by persons on release").
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
107. See supra note 11.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). judicial interpretation of the statute indicates that the bur-
den to prove guilt, imposed on the government at the pretrial hearing, may be to meet the
minimum probable cause standard. See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text. The
burden may be met by mere proffer of the government. See infra notes 147-56 and accom-
panying text.
109. A prediction based on a proven fact would be far less tenuous. For example,
statistical studies have found that incidents of criminal activity by bailed defendants, even
defendants charged with the traditional high bail offenses involving drugs and armed rob-
bery, are not significant. Recidivism rates for defendants with indications of prior hard
drug use on the other hand is quite significant. See Ervin, supra note 34, at 295, 311 n.60,
312-13 n.72, 326 n. 147 (reviewing a variety of statistical studies regarding predictability of
pretrial recidivism).
110. See infra notes 138-60 and accompanying text (describing heavy evidentiary bur-
den defendants must meet to gain release when presumption applies).
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At a detention hearing, the defendant is provided with an op-
portunity to rebut this presumption with the assistance of coun-
sel."1 The defendant also has the right to testify, to present wit-
nesses, to cross-examine all witnesses who appear at the hearing,
and to proffer information. The type of evidence each side may
offer is described in subsection (g), defining the factors judges
must take into account.' It must also be noted, however, that the
rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not
apply in a detention hearing.1 4 The hearing requirements are in-
tended to guarantee that minimum due process requirements are
met, while preserving an informal pretrial procedure. The statute
requires the government to support its motion for detention with
clear and convincing evidence that detention is warranted in the
individual situation. 5The government is free, however, to submit
evidence by hearsay or proffer. 116The defendant's right to cross-
examine government witnesses extends only to witnesses who have
testified in the pretrial hearing. Therefore, the defendant's right
to cross-examine is wholly dependent upon the method that the
government chooses for presenting its evidence.1 17
A. Evidentiary Presumption in Practice
The law of evidentiary burdens of proof and presumptions
has primarily developed for the trial setting. An important con-
cern underlying many of the evidentiary rules is to ensure the
presence of a well-informed, objective jury. A pretrial detention
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
112. Id.
113. See supra note 97.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(o.
115. Id.; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424, 428 (1979) (defining "clear
and convincing" evidence as an intermediate standard of proof which has been defined as
appropriate in cases in which individual's interest at stake is "more substantial than mere
loss of money" but less substantial than the consequences of criminal conviction).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The statutory language may be read as if only the defendant
is given the opportunity to proffer evidence. Nonetheless, cases have held that, since the
trial rules of evidence do not apply, the government may also proffer evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 207 (1st Cir. 1985).
117. The defendant's right is so limited despite the fact that the existence of the de-
fendant's right to cross-examine government witnesses has been an important considera-
tion for courts that have upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the face of procedural
due process challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp 1442, 1452 (N.D.
Ill. 1984).
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hearing, arguably, does not warrant comparable concerns as the
judicial officer acts as both judge, making findings of law, and
jury, making findings of fact.""8 A second important purpose for
many of the evidentiary rules is the deterrence of improper police
behavior. Rules regarding admissible evidence at a pretrial deten-
tion hearing should be equally concerned with achieving this goal.
The 1984 Act specifically provides that the rules of proce-
dure established for trials, such as the rules governing admissibil-
ity of evidence, do not apply at the detention hearing.119 How-
ever, like a trial, a detention hearing functions as a procedural
device for determining the existence of certain facts-whether
the accused is dangerous or likely to flee. Thus, the logical process
of inferring the existence of one fact from proof of another oper-
ates in a pretrial hearing, as in any fact-finding procedure. The
judicial decisions that have discussed the function of the statutory
presumption present in section 3142(e) of the Bail Act have recog-
nized this and have turned to the rules of evidence as applied in
trials. For these reasons, it would appear that the rules regarding
the operation of presumptions at trial should also be applicable at
the detention hearing.1 20
1. Rule of Evidentiary Presumptions. The term "burden of
proof" describes two separate evidentiary burdens that may be im-
posed on a party at trial. The "production" burden requires a
party to submit sufficient evidence relating to a particular fact in
issue, such that the judge is satisfied that there is "a quantity of
evidence fit to be considered by the jury and to form a reasonable
basis for the verdict."1 21 The "persuasion" burden is the heavier
burden of demonstrating that the evidence introduced tends to
show that an alleged fact is true. 2 The former burden describes
the proof a party must provide in order to avoid a directed verdict
in the opponent's favor. The latter describes the proof a party
must provide in order to win. The party with this "persuasion"
118. See United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 384 (1st Cir. 1985) (commenting that
law of presumptions may confuse juries but not judges who are "used to weighing several
competing factors").
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. See Comment, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness Under the Bail Re-
form Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 231 n.37 (1985).
121. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336-49 (3d ed. 1984).
122. E. CLEARY, supra note 121, § 336; J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487, at 293
(Chadbourn rev. 1981).
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burden bears the risk that the fact-finder's belief will not be suffi-
ciently high to act as the party wishes. 123
Presumptions are used in criminal proceedings to shift some
aspect of the burden of proof from one party to the other,
thereby affecting the amount of evidence to be presented by each
party.1 24 A statutory presumption is established as the result of a
legislative finding that, in the majority of circumstances, where
one fact is present (the proved or predictor fact), a second fact is
more likely to be true than not (the presumed or predicted
fact). 25 This necessarily recognizes that the presumed fact is not
always true. However, the burden of proving that the presumed
event has not occurred is placed on the party asserting that the
instant situation is a deviation from the norm.
The extent of a statutory presumption's impact on the out-
come of a trial will depend upon the type of presumption at is-
sue. 128 The prevailing view in the federal courts is that the least
outcome-determinative role, a "bursting bubble," is the appropri-
ate use of presumption in a criminal trial.1 27 With this role of a
presumption in effect, once a defendant introduces evidence
which tends to show that the relationship between the proved pre-
dictor fact and the presumed fact may not be true for the situa-
tion at hand, an anomaly is established and the presumption
"bursts." Effectively, the presumption disappears from the case.1 28
123. "A risk of non-persuasion naturally exists any time one person attempts to per-
suade another to act or not to act. If the other does not change his course of action or
nonaction, the person desiring change has, of course, failed." E. CLEARY, supra note 121, §
336, at 348.
124. See Comment, Possession of Dangerous Drugs in a Car-New York's Criminal Presump-
tion Statute, 21 BurrALo L. REv. 188, 201-05 (1971-72) (analysis of Supreme Court decisions
demonstrating need for due process review of statutory criminal presumptions which alter
burdens of proof).
125. See Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal
Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YA L.J. 165, 165 (1969).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380 (1st Cir. 1985)
"[A] burden of persuasion" . . . or only a "burden of production". . . [i]f the
former, the alleged drug offender would have to prove he would not flee - i.e.,
he would have to persuade the judicial officer on the point. If the latter, he
would only have to introduce a certain amount of evidence contrary to the pre-
sumed fact; no change in the burden of persuasion is effected.
127. See Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1976); E. CLEARY, supra note 121, at
974 (bursting bubble theory is most widely followed presumption in American law); cf. FED.
R. EVID. 301 (shifting burden of coming forward in civil cases).
128. See United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 382 (1985).
1986] 713
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
For example, if there is a rebuttable presumption that everyone in
a car owns any drugs found in that car, evidence which would
tend to show a particular passenger's lack of knowledge would
eliminate the presumption and put the presumed knowledge in
dispute. The burden of proof and persuasion would thus be
shifted back to the prosecution."29
The most outcome-determinative role of a presumption is the
"mandatory" or nonrebuttable application. Once facts that raise a
nonrebuttable presumption are entered into evidence, the eviden-
tiary burden shifts to the presumed-against party. This party may
only avoid the result dictated by the presumption by directly re-
futing the facts that raised it. The direct relationship between the
predictor fact and the presumed fact is unimpeachable.130 For ex-
ample, if the earlier presumption, regarding ownership of drugs
discovered in a car full of people, were a mandatory presumption,
then evidence tending to show one passenger-defendant's igno-
rance regarding the presence of drugs would be irrelevant. The
evidence necessary for the defense of any passenger in the car
would be limited to that evidence which challenged either the ac-
tual presence of the drugs in the car or the voluntariness of the
defendant's status as a passenger in the car. Likewise, if probable
cause of guilt alone were sufficient evidence to allow a court to
presume that the characteristics of an accused require denial of
bail, then the fact of a legal arrest or indictment would be suffi-
cient reason for an order of preventive detention.13 1 Suspicion,
129. Id.
130. One commentator has noted:
A "conclusive" or "irrebuttable" presumption is actually not a presumption at
all If one fact is conclusively presumed from proof of another fact, then the
party against whom the presumption operates is precluded from showing evi-
dence that the fact presumed does not exist. In reality, this is a rule of substan-
tive law, because the existence of the fact presumed is immaterial.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 122, § 2492, at 307-08; see also Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1162
(8th Cir. 1981) (detention statute unconstitutional because it contained conclusive pre-
sumption which left no discretion in judicial officer to grant or deny detention), vacated as
moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp.
1283, 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (detention statute not arbitrary if it does not compel court to
reach a given outcome).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Acceturo, 783 F.2d 382, 390 (3d Cir. 1986) (declining
to decide whether an indictment alone is sufficient to trigger presumption but noting that
the district court found that it was); United States v. Maktabi, 601 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (probable cause triggers presumption of dangerousness); United States v. Payden,
598 F. Supp. 1388, 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (probable cause as prerequisite to detentidn but
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rather than individual characteristics relevant to bail risk, would
become a sufficient ground for a serious deprivation of liberty.13 2
2. Evidentiary Presumptions in the Pretrial Bail Hearing. When
evidence is introduced at a bail hearing demonstrating a defend-
ant's guilt for the crime charged, a mandatory presumption is cre-
ated that pretrial release is inappropriate. The hearing becomes a
preliminary mini-trial on the merits, with the judicial officer evalu-
ating the probability of guilt, rather than assessing the individual
defendant's characteristics pertaining to the decision of whether
detention or release on conditions is more appropriate. The rele-
vant proof in a pretrial hearing with such a presumption would be
evidence of innocence. In contrast, a rebuttable presumption
would allow a defendant to address the connection between the
proven fact and the presumed fact. The relevant proof would
then be evidence tending to indicate the appropriateness of re-
lease conditions rather than innocence.
In Hunt v. Roth, 183 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit found unconstitutional a provision of the Nebraska State
Constitution that required detention without bail of persons
charged with rape.13 4 The court reasoned that the state provision,
rather than providing an opportunity for a judge to determine
whether or not the individual situation warranted detention, cre-
ated a mandatory presumption that detention was appropriate re-
gardless of the particular circumstances of the crime or the indi-
not itself sufficient to justify detention); cf. United States v. Hawkins, 617 F.2d 59, 61 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 962 (1980) (pre-1984 decision where even prior conviction not
sufficient to justify detention on existing charges).
132. But suspicion is not an adequate ground for the less serious deprivation of liberty
involved in an arrest. See Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 13
(1960) (noting that "[a]rrests for suspicion are not countenanced by the Bill of Rights.");
see also United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1001 (2d Cir. 1986). ("More-
over, if the arrest is thought to reflect that the person is more deserving of confinement
than members of the public not accused of crime, the confinement would offend the proce-
dural component of due process by dispensing with the procedural guarantees of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments . . . ."); Tribe, supra note 8, at 405-06. ("[lit is arbitrary to im-
prison [a] man about to be tried for a past offense while imposing no restraint on [a] man
not facing trial. Nor is it easy to explain why a man subjected to preventive confinement
before trial should suddenly become immune to such detention upon acquittal.").
133. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981).
134. Id. at 1151 (quoting the Nebraska Constitution: "All persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except for. . . sexual offenses involving penetration by force or against
the will of the victim . . . where the proof is evident or the presumption great." Na.
CONsT. art. I, § 9 (1875, amended 1978)).
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vidual characteristics of the defendant. 3 5 This mandatory
outcome was held to have prevented proper decision making by a
judicial officer in a bail hearing. Proper bail decisions under the
Hunt rule necessarily include an opportunity for a decision maker
to balance an individual's interest in retaining his or her liberty
prior to adjudication of guilt against society's interest in detention
of that individual.3 6 Without that opportunity, the Nebraska de-
tention provision was found to result in arbitrary and unreasona-
ble denials of bail under the eighth amendment. 137
3. Judicial Interpretation of the Section 3142(e) Presumption. A
rebuttable presumption, by definition, should not have the objec-
tionable effect, as struck down in Hunt, of absolutely denying bail
to the class of persons to which it applies. The judicial interpreta-
tion of the section 3142(e) rebuttable presumption, however,
shifts a burden of proof which is so difficult to meet that the class
of persons within the scope of the presumption will be regularly
denied pretrial release.138
135. Hunt, 648 F.2d at 1163 (contrasting the Nebraska detention provisions with the
D.C. preventive detention statute under which "an individual is afforded procedural safe-
guards and the government must prove that the individual's behavior presents a risk to the
community.,") (emphasis in original).
136. Id. at 1162-63; see also Schall v Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (upholding New York stat-
ute due, in part, to proper balancing); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501,
510 (D.P.R. 1984) (noting need to balance facts of each individual case). Even one strong
advocate of preventive detention, former U.S. Attorney General Mitchell, pointed out:
"[due process] requirements are those of reasonableness-the restraints imposed on the
liberty of an accused must be reasonable when balanced against society's acknowledged
interest in preventing commission of further crimes while the defendant is awaiting trial."
Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1234-35.
137. Hunt, 648 F.2d at 1162; see also id. at 1161 (recognizing Congress' and a state
legislature's power to legislate as to right to bail for certain offenses if legislation not arbi-
trary or unreasonable); United States v. Payden, 598 F.Supp. 1388, 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(judicial evaluation of evidence under the 1984 Act not unconstitutional); cf County Court
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979) ("[1]n criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device's
constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the
fact finder's responsibility at trial ... to find the ultimate facts."). But see Comment, The
Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. CH. L. REV. 141, 156 (1966):
However, the readiest solution to this empirical problem, acceptance of legisla-
tive competence, is equally distressing; for it appears that the legislative branch
is not in these cases making a considered judgment as to relationship between
one fact and another. Rather, legislative action is a response to difficulty exper-
ienced in securing convictions.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hazime, 762 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal.
1985); United States v. Askari, 608 F. Supp. 1045 (E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v.
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An early case reviewing the section 3142(e) rebuttable pre-
sumption, United States v. Aiello,189 held that the statute shifted the
burden of persuasion to the defendant once the presumption was
triggered.1, 0 Under this ruling, the government may meet its bur-
den of showing that a defendant poses a high risk of flight or a
danger to society merely by showing that there is probable cause
to believe the defendant is guilty of a serious narcotics offense."1
Probable cause for arrest, without more, is therefore sufficient
proof to justify an order of pretrial detention. 42
The majority of cases construing the section 3142(e) pre-
sumption have held that Congress shifted the lesser burden, the
burden of production, to defendants.1 4 3 Under this interpretation
of the presumption, the defendant's burden is to present any evi-
dence which tends to rebut the presumption thereby forcing the
government to present evidence beyond mere probable cause of
guilt.144 Subsequently, the judge weighs the evidence to determine
Maktabi, 601 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Lepere, 599 F. Supp. 1322,
modified, 603 F. Supp. 375 (D. Mass. 1985); see also infra notes 143-46 and accompanying
text (describing burden on accused under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)). The possible effect of a
"presumption" or "burden of proof" on the outcome of a hearing is broad ranging. See
supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. Yet Congress gave virtually no consideration
and has provided no guidance as to the meaning or application of the presumptions in the
Bail Reform Act.
139. 598 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
140. Id. at 744-45. The court noted "a real burden to show specific facts rebutting the
presumption falls to the defendant." It proceeded to describe 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) as guid-
ance to defendants as to the facts necessary to carry this heavy burden.
141. Id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975)).
142. See supra note 129 and accompanying text; cf. Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th
Cir. 1981) (striking down provision which did not allow sufficient opportunity to refute
presumption in favor of detention), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478
(1982).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2nd Cir. 1985); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378 (1st Cir.
1985); United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Freitas,
602 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
144. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(o (Supp. III 1985) (government
must prove detention is warranted by "clear and convincing evidence"). The proof re-
quired of the government is that no conditions of release will assure safety of community
and that detention is only method available. See, e.g., United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp.
1283, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 496-97 (N.D. Cal.
1985); United States v. Jones, 614 F. Supp. 96, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v.
Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 509 (D.P.R. 1984), affid, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985);
see also United States v. Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506, 1509 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (distin-
guishing government's burden for dangerousness-clear and convincing-from burden for
flight-preponderance of evidence).
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if any release conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's ap-
pearance at trial and the safety of the community.14 Detention is
ordered only after the government has demonstrated, by clear
and convincing evidence, that it is necessary to detain because
there are no conditions of release that can provide such
assurance.
1 6
The government's evidentiary burden, however, is eased by
the informal evidentiary requirements of the pretrial hearing.
Section 3142(f expressly allows the submission of evidence
through hearsay or proffer.147 This informality has withstood pro-
cedural due process attacks because of the judicial and congres-
sional recognition of the need for informal and speedy conduct of
detention hearings148 and the acceptance of regulatory detention
hearings without the "full panoply of adversary safeguards."11 4'
The dicta of the procedural due process cases indicate that the
government must present sufficiently reliable evidence demon-
strating the need for detention before the "obvious deprivation of
liberty. 1 5 0 In United States v. Hazzard,"5 " the court responded to
an attack upon the sufficiency of procedural safeguards by noting
that although the government has the right to submit evidence by
hearsay, "hearsay alone will rarely, if ever, satisfy the clear and
convincing standard" necessary for pretrial detention. 52 Other
courts have likewise noted that the presumption alone cannot
carry the evidentiary burden: "[T]he government may not rest
solely on the rebuttable presumption to support its motion to de-
145. Cases in which the court found that there were conditions sufficient to reasonably
assure safety and the defendant's appearance at trial include United States v. Orta, 760
F.2d 887, 890-91 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 249 (5th Cir.
1985); United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1408 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(o. For examples of the type of evidence the government
may use which will be adequate to meet this burden, see, for example, United States v.
Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283
(N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501 (D.P.R. 1984), affd,
755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F.Supp. 1442 (N.D. III. 1984);
see also United States v. O'Shaughnessy, 764 F.2d 1035, 1037 (5th Cir. 1985) (detention
should be allowed only when "necessary" to public safety interest).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d. 203, 207-08 (1st Cir. 1985).
149. United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 499-500 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 119 (1975)) (informal proof acceptable at probable cause hearings).
150.. United States v Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 998 (2d Cir. 1986).
151. 598 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
152. Id. at 1453.
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tain a defendant pending trial. Evidence that the defendant com-
mitted the.., offense with which he is charged, even if very com-
pelling, cannot by itself satisfy [the statutory requirement]." '153
Despite such pronouncements that the government bears the
burden of proof, the government is winning detention hearings
with only de minimis showings of the need for detention. The
trend appears to be toward expediting the procedures and detain-
ing defendants based on the statutory presumption alone. A re-
cent Second Circuit decision did away with even the assertion of a
real evidentiary burden on the government. In United States v.
Martir,1 " the court upheld the detention of an accused narcotics
offender despite noting:
that the government.., referred to no independent evidence, such as tapes,
documents, or photographs, of the crimes charged, nor did it furnish testi-
mony or an affidavit to describe or summarize, albeit in hearsay form, in
even moderate detail, the forthcoming trial testimony of its witnesses. The
government simply stated in the most general and conclusory terms what it
hoped to prove.15s
It is this type of analysis that has resulted in the uniformity of
reported decisions of denial of bail in section 3142(e) narcotics
presumption detention hearings.156 Defendants' failures to win re-
lease, even when willing to comply with substantial restrictions of
their liberty, 157 result from the two-pronged presumption that
153. Moore, 607 F. Supp. at 498; see also id. at 496 (evidentiary basis for detention still
necessary) and cases cited supra notes 144 (describing clear and convincing requirement)
and 146 (describing government's burden of proo.
154. 782 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1986).
155. Id. at 1147.
156. See United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Maull,
773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d
378 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1985); United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283
(N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). But see
United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985) (defendant charged with armed
robbery, not subject to presumption, is able to show sufficient conditions to gain pretrial
release); United States v. Hawkins 617 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.), (pre-1984 Act case where one
previous conviction was considered insufficient, by itself, to prove the need for preventive
detention), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 962 (1980).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 777
F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding statutory conditions for release deemed satisfied by lower
court not sufficient to protect community); United States v. Lepere, 599 F. Supp. 1322,
1325 (D. Mass. 1984) ("While the court believes that defendant's proposed conditions of
release and the proffered property ... significantly negate the risk of flight evidenced by
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must be rebutted. The section 3142(e) presumption regarding
drug offenders is interpreted conjunctively, presuming both flight
and dangerousness of an accused drug offender. 158 The burden on
the government, in addition to probable cause, is to offer some
evidence supporting the presumption in one or both prongs.159
The accused thus has the multiple burden of rebutting both
prongs of the presumption, as well as any additional evidence of-
fered by the government.1 60 A mere "burden of production" on a
defendant seeking pretrial release becomes quite substantial in
light of the two-part presumption favoring the detention.
IV. AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF SECTION 3142(e)
Preventive detention, a crime-prevention strategy perceived
by many legal scholars as inconsistent with traditional American
legal precepts,161 is an idea that nonetheless appears to have taken
root. 62 The underlying assumptions necessary to justify preven-
tive detention are that: (1) future criminal behavior can be suffi-
ciently predicted to justify a serious deprivation of liberty; (2) pre-
trial detention is within the regulatory powers of Congress; and
(3) an individual's interest in remaining at liberty prior to formal
adjudication of guilt can be outweighed by the public's interest in
crime prevention. These assumptions have thus far withstood con-
his absence from the jurisdiction for three years, the court is not persuaded that they ade-
quately rebut the statutory presumption of risk of flight and danger.").
158. Compare notes 101-05 and accompanying text with notes 106-10 and accompany-
ing text. Note that the presumption against a person accused of a narcotics offense is far
broader than the presumption which applies when a person with a prior conviction for
crimes committed during release.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Jessup, 757 F. 2d 378 (1st Cir. 1985) (government did
not meet dangerousness burden but defendant was detained based on more traditional risk
of flight considerations); United States v. Askari, 608 F. Supp. 1045 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (gov-
ernment need only show either no conditions assure safety or no conditions assure appear-
ance; statute does not increase government's burden of proof.).
160. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1986) (gov-
ernment must specify whether it will prove whether flight concerns or dangerousness con-
cerns warrant detention; however, because presumption predicts both risk of flight and
dangerousness, narcotics defendant must rebut both prongs).
161. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
162. Senator Edward M. Kennedy hailed the 1984 Bail Act as a two-decade long bi-
partisan effort. He noted: "It is as much a victory for the Republicans as for the Demo-
crats, for Congresses all the way back to 1967, for Attorneys General from Robert Ken-
nedy and Ramsey Clark to Griffin Bell and William French Smith, and for Presidents from
Lyndon Johnson to Ronald Reagan." Kennedy, Forward, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. vii, x (1985).
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stitutional attacks in the federal courts.1 13 This Comment does not
attempt to reargue these assumptions. Rather, it outlines an argu-
ment against the existing procedures of the Act while accepting
the validity of the above assumptions. Defendants faced with de-
tention under the 1984 Act are more likely to win pretrial release
by attacking the procedural mechanisms of the Act, rather than
by attacking the preventive premises of the Act.
The basis of the argument outlined by this Comment is that
the presumption, which predicts that certain defendants should be
detained because of alleged membership within a defined group,
withdraws the statutory procedural protections that are essential
to the constitutionality of pretrial detention. Pretrial detention in-
evitably results in the deprivation of the fundamental individual
liberty protected by the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments
to the Constitution. Any government action that allows depriva-
tion of fundamental rights without proper procedural safeguards
is open to attack. Although the procedures of the 1984 Bail Re-
form Act have been found constitutionally acceptable by the fed-
eral courts, the effect of the rebuttable presumption of section
3142(e) is susceptible to just such an attack."6 It is this presump-
tion which reverses the release bias16 5 of the Act for those identi-
fied groups and, in so doing, prejudices the balance between an
individual's interests and those of the public. The presumption re-
sults in the courts' uniform treatment of members of those
groups, in contravention of the equal protection requirements of
judicial balancing on an individual case-by-case basis. 6
Broadly defined, the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion is a guarantee that no person, or class of persons, shall be
denied the same protection of their fundamental rights that is en-
joyed by other persons in like circumstances. 1 7 Similarly, substan-
163. See, e.g., cases listed supra note 13.
164. In 1960, Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas criticized the use of va-
grancy statutes on the grounds that: "A man who is idle and has no visible means of sup-
port is placed in a criminal category, because he is deemed likely to commit a crime in
order to gain a livelihood... [improperly allows for conviction based on mere suspicion]."
Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE LJ. 1, 11 (1960). The basis for pretrial
detention of narcotics offenders-the suspicion that, as a class, they will continue to partici-
pate in narcotics offenses, see 1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 20, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3203-is strikingly similar to the offensive aspects of vagrancy statutes.
165. See supra note 88.
166. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
167. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking use of durational residence
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tive due process under the fifth amendment guarantees equal pro-
tection in its prevention of arbitrary and unreasonable laws that
cause a person or a class to be deprived."1 8 The final section of
this Comment will apply the steps of an equal protection analysis
to the evidentiary presumption of the 1984 Act. This analysis will
show that the Act, by depriving individual defendants of their
fundamental constitutional rights based upon suspicion of their
membership in a class, violates the requirements of equal
protection.
The initial step in the constitutional evaluation of the section
3142(e) presumption is to determine whether a fundamental right
is affected by its use. If a fundamental right is affected, then the
next step a court must take is to strictly scrutinize the nature of
the relationship between the presumption and the governmental
interest that the statute is intended to promote.169 Strict scrutiny
requires that if a constitutionally protected individual right is af-
fected: "the regulation limiting those rights may be justified only
by a compelling state interest." 170 Courts reviewing the section
3142(e) presumption have not found it difficult to recognize that
the prevention of crime is a compelling state interest.17 1 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that "even though the govern-
mental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal lib-
requirements prevented exercise of fundamental right to vote by a class distinguishable
only for invalid reasons); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 667 (1966) (striking
use of voter affluence requirements and poll taxes because they have no relation to funda-
mental right to vote and invidiously discriminate against a class for no valid reason).
168. The fifth amendment due process clause has been construed to incorporate a
guarantee of equal protection of the law. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
United States v. Jackson, 553 F.2d 109, 119 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
169. The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny where the result of a statute was
the denial of fundamental rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1965);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
170. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). Decisions holding that a competing
state interest in the statutory purpose is required to justify a statute which imposes limita-
tions on a fundamental personal right include Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963); cf. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodrigues, 411 U.S.
1 (1973); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). In these cases, a legitimate and
substantial state purpose was found inadequate to justify a statute that imposed a limitation
on fundamental liberties.
171. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984); United States v. Melendez-
Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1000 (2d Cir. 1986).
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erties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. 1 7 2 Thus, the
final step of the analysis is to review the chosen method itself and
to ascertain whether there is a less restrictive means to promote
the same governmental interest.173
A. Fundamental Rights at Stake: The Fifth and Eighth Amendments
1. Pretrial Detention Limits the Fundamental Right to Liberty
Guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. A fundamental liberty interest
is threatened when an individual who has been accused, but not
yet convicted, of a crime is incarcerated.17 4 Constitutionally pro-
tected liberty extends to the full range of conduct an individual is
free to pursue 17 5 and that liberty "has always included freedom
from bodily restraint. 1 76 Incarceration under the Bail Act "cer-
tainly entails significant affirmative restraints on bodily movement,
travel, association with others, and hosts of other freedoms. '1 77
An aspect of the fundamental right to liberty is the right to
be free from punishment prior to conviction of a crime.17 8 Incar-
ceration in a penal institution, however, may not constitute "pun-
ishment." The right to liberty may be denied as punishment or it
"may be denied in some limited circumstances as regulation.91 7 9
The procedural due process requirements prior to incarceration
will vary depending on the statutory purpose underlying the pro-
172. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964) (citations omitted).
173. See id. at 307-08; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
174. Both the courts and Congress have recognized this fact. See Comment, supra note
8, at 239-41.
175. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
176. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d. 984, 1006 (2d Cir 1986) (Feinberg,
C.J., concurring); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-79 (1977) (noting that
historic definition of liberty includes freedom from bodily restraint); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (noting advantages of liberty to a parolee, whether a right or
privilege, "is valuable and must be seen within the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."); id. at 998 ("Indeed, physical confinement of an individual is the ultimate depriva-
tion of liberty.").
177. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1008 (2d Cir 1986); see also
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (fundamental individual
right to enjoy privacy of one's family); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (fun-
damental individual right to travel); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
164-65 (1972) (fundamental individual right to freedom of association with others).
178. See Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 998-1000.
179. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 998; see also supra notes 21-29 and accompanying
text (regarding Korematsu decision).
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visions for detention. When the purpose of a statute is regulatory,
the procedural protections need not be as stringent as when the
statutory purpose is penal.
The courts that have reviewed the sufficiency of the 1984
Act's procedural protections have consistently found that the pur-
pose of the Act is regulatory, rather than penal.180 The regula-
tory-penal distinction loses significance in an equal protection
analysis. In the equal protection case, we are only concerned with
whether: (1) there is a fundamental right affected by the statute 81
and (2) the statute treats individuals differently based on classifica-
tions that are not the least restrictive means for advancing the
statute's purpose. 82 However, it is interesting to note that several
recent decisions regarding the Act have found that, if pretrial reg-
ulatory detention is "too long," it takes on the characteristics of a
"penal" incarceration rather than a "regulatory" incarceration,
and must be terminated.1 83
The significance of detention taking on the characteristics of
penal incarceration under an equal protection analysis is that de-
fendants accused of federal narcotics offenses are usually detained
180. See, e.g., Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1000; United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d
758, 762 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1485 (8th Cir. 1985) (en
banc); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 387 (1st Cir. 1985).
181. See supra note 167.
182. Classifications which meet this requirement should be narrowly defined to in-
clude only those people that are within the purpose of the statute to affect. An appropriate
characteristic may include proven incidents of hard drug use. See supra note 109.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1986) (Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee reviewing Bail Reform Act expected that Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. II 1985), would alleviate any constitutional infirmity
by ensuring 90-day "upper-bound" on waiting period for trial); Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d
at 999 (detention period not strictly limited in time; delays may last for more than a year);
United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (5th Cir. 1986) (due process required defendant
be released on bond or tried within 30 days); United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 101
(2d Cir. 1985) (Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 Supp. III 1985), may not
"work perfectly well to protect against lengthy incarceration"); United States v. Acceturo,
783 F.2d 382, 387-88 (3d Cir. 1984) (detention period may become too long to survive
proper due process challenge). United States v. Vitta, No. 86-CR-452 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
1986) ("[Any pretrial detention of more than 90 days exceeds what Congress contem-
plated, and a pretrial detention of more than 6 months should flash a warning that a viola-
tion of due process has probably occurred."); United States v. LoFranco, 620 F. Supp 1324
(N.D.N.Y. 1985) (incarceration for over six months without trial made detention without
bail violation of due process); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1451 n.5 (N.D.
11. 1984) (pretrial detention under Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), does have time limit).
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for substantial amounts of time prior to trial.184 The greater
length of detention for accused narcotics offenders indicates that
a greater threat to liberty interest is involved and that more,
rather than less, procedural protections should be afforded prior
to pretrial incarceration. Yet, the rebuttable presumption in sec-
tion 3142(e) results in less procedural protections for accused nar-
cotics offenders.
2. The Eighth Amendment Does Not Clearly Establish a Fundamen-
tal Right to Bail. The terse language of the eighth amendment
does not explicitly provide for a right to bail.18 5 It has been ar-
gued, however, that the amendment's proscription of excessive
bail does provide an accused person with an implied fundamental
right to bail.186 This argument points out that failure to set bail
184. United States v. Colombo, 616 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 777 F.2d 96
(2d Cir. 1986).
185. The eighth amendment provides no more than that: "Excessive bail shall not be
required." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
186. See, e.g., Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: , 13 U. PA. L. REv. 959
(1965) (arguing that eighth amendment implies right to bail); Note, supra note 8 (arguing
that eighth amendment provides right to bail). But see Duker, supra note 15 (arguing there
is no right to bail established by eighth amendment); Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial De-
tention, 60 GEo. LJ. 1140 (1972) (arguing that it is not possible to read into eighth amend-
ment guarantee of right to bail before trial in noncapital cases without violence to clear
language of constitution).
An additional argument offered to support an implied constitutional right to bail is sug-
gested by the "presumption of innocence." This presumption has been described by the
Supreme Court as a "bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose enforcement lies
at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
363 (1970). The principle was linked to the right to bail in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951), by the following dictum : "unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its mean-
ing." The validity of this argument was seriously undermined by another Supreme Court
case, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979), which stated that in dictum that "[t]he
presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal tri-
als" and "has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during
confinement before his trial has even begun." Although the Court was dealing with the
narrow question of prison officials' right to impose restrictions on pretrial detainees who
did not challenge the validity of their confinement, id. at 522, rather than the actual deci-
sion to detain, the weight of authority has interpreted Bell as defining the presumption of
innocence as a rule of evidence only at criminal trials. See, e.g., United States v. Freitas, 602
F. Supp. 1283, 1291-92 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (Bell precludes use of presumption of innocence as
argument against pretrial detention); United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp. 1388, 1397
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), (rejecting presumption of innocence argument on rationale that if valid, it
would preclude all pretrial detention), rev'd, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1985) United States v.
Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1443, 1449 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Bell makes clear that presumption of
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"denies the liberty of an arrested person in precisely the same
manner as setting bail in an amount so excessive that it cannot
possibly be posted. 1 87 The precise nature of the protection, or
"right" guaranteed by the eighth amendment, however, has yet to
be conclusively determined by the Supreme Court. 8
The leading cases from the Supreme Court address the right
to bail issue only in dicta and, although decided during the same
term, present apparently opposing views. In Stack v. Boyle,189 while
addressing the excessiveness of particular bail orders, the Court
noted that there is a "traditional right to freedom before convic-
tion [that] permits the unhampered preparation of a defense and
serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to convic-
tion." 9 This traditional right was seen by the Court as stemming
from the theory-inherent in our criminal justice system-that it
is preferable to enable defendants to stay out of jail until a trial
has determined their guilt. Without the preservation of this tradi-
tional right to bail before trial, the Court warned: "The presump-
tion of innocence, secured after centuries of struggle, would loose
its meaning."1 91 The resulting societal danger was perceived as a
calculated risk which the law assumes as the price of our system of
justice.192
In Carlson v. Landon,1" on the other hand, the Court noted
that the "very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests
must be bailable." " Carlson was concerned with the narrow ques-
tion of whether the United States Attorney General had the
power, under certain civil statutes, to detain alien communists in
custody and without bail, as threats to national security, pending
innocence relevant for trial, not detention hearing). But see Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S.
277, 285 (1895) ("United States statutes have been framed on the theory that an accused
shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court of last resort, or absolutely
compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment, but may be admitted to bail . . .
187. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 996 (2d Cir. 1986).
188. The Supreme Court declined an opportunity to do so by denying review in
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022
(1982).
189. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
194. Id. at 546.
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deportation proceedings.1 95 Nonetheless, many lower courts have
cited Carlson in support of their finding that Congress has the in-
herent power to define bailable and nonbailable crimes. 96
In a seminal case on preventive detention, United States v. Ed-
wards,1 97 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized
the inconclusive nature of the Stack and Carlson dicta regarding a
constitutional right to bail.19 The Edwards court attempted to re-
solve the issue by conducting an independent analysis of the evi-
dence supporting an implied right to bail under the eighth
amendment. 99 The analysis included an historical review of bail
practice in England, colonial and early state bail practices, the Bill
of Rights, and the American form of constitutional government.
The court concluded that, although Congress had traditionally
provided a statutory right to bail, the eighth amendment could
not be interpreted to prevent Congress from defining nonbailable
offenses.200 The eighth amendment was found, under this analysis,
to address the framers' concern over judicial abuse of the bail
system.2°'
The Edwards analysis raises several disturbing issues.20 2 The
195. See generally IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND DEFENSE (National Lawyers Guild 2d ed. 1981) (chapter 6 describing grounds for
deportation under congress' plenary powers; Chapter 2, § 2.5, describing legislative
changes in 1950's and 60's which included "politically dangerous" in their definition of
deportable); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, AN EVALUATION ON POLICY RELATED RE-
SEARCH ON THE EFrECTIVENESS OF PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS 75 n.43 (1975) (arguing
Carlson should not be strong precedent in criminal law field because it involved civil deten-
tion of alien communists awaiting deportation).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1985);
United States v. Acavedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 506 (D.P.R. 1984), affd, 755 F.2d 203
(1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1449 (N.D. II. 1984).
197. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), is also often cited for the premise that preventive detention is
constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1985);
United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Haz-
zard, 598 F. Supp. 1422, 1452 (N.D. IlI. 1984). However, the statute involved in Schall
dealt only with juvenile defendants, id. at 255, and is therefore not dispositive of the consti-
tutionality of preventive detention for competent adults.
198. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1329-30; see also Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389, 1392, 93
(Alaska 1974) (noting inconclusive nature of Stack and Carlson); Comment, supra note 31,
at 196-97 n.50 (noting that subsequent cases alternatively use Stack or Calson dicta).
199. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1326.
200. Id. at 1327. The court relied heavily on Duker, supra note 15, a historical review
of the status of the eighth amendment.
201. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1328-29.
202. See Comment, supra note 31, at 196-202.
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court gave no weight to the fundamental differences between the
American Congress and the British Parliament.20 3 The analysis ig-
nored the fact that the Supreme Court had already rejected analo-
gies to English practice in cases involving the deprivation of indi-
vidual rights.20 ' The analysis also ignored the line of cruel and
unusual punishment cases in which the Supreme Court found that
the background of the American Bill of Rights "makes it clear
that the eighth amendment was intended to apply not only to acts
of judges but as a restraint on legislative action as well." 20 5 This
distinction between the legislative and judicial branches should
take on heightened significance in a situation where, as with sec-
tion 3142(e), the American Congress impinges on the distinct
powers of the judiciary to ascertain the facts in an individual
showing. 206 The weight of current case law, however, demon-
strates that the federal courts follow the Edwards conclusion and
remain unwilling to find the eighth amendment sufficient to estab-
lish a fundamental right to bail. 07
3. Pretrial Detention Should be Subject to Strict Constitutional
Scrutiny. The interpretation of the eighth amendment's insuffi-
ciency for establishing a right to bail does not conversely imply
that a broad authority resides in Congress to determine the cir-
cumstances in which bail may be denied. 8 Unless the amendment
203. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1331.
204. The Supreme Court made this distinction in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S.
501, 508 (1972); see also Comment, supra note 31, at 198 (noting difference between U.S.
Congress and English Parliament in level of governmental control over individual rights).
205. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1031 (2d Cir. 1973). To the same effect, see
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 266-69, 316-22 (1972) (concurrences of Brennan & Mar-
shall, J.J.); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371-73 (1910); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436, 446-47 (1890).
206. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. In fact, the Supreme Court has
recognized that individualized treatment may be necessary to prevent apparently war-
ranted punitive sanctions from being administered in a cruel and unusual manner. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 582-83 (1979) (Stevens and Brennan, J.J., dissenting, citing Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32
(1958)).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 984, 997 (2d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp 489, 493 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Freitas,
602 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Aiello, 598 F. Supp 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
208. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1160-62 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub
nora. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982).
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is to be interpreted out of existence, it must afford some level of
protection for the fundamental right to liberty.20 9 Although pre-
tinal detention may not qualify as "punishment, '2 10 a pretrial de-
tainee is subject to every restriction and degradation of incarcera-
tion.211 Incarceration results in a detainee's diminished ability to
prepare a defense for the impending trial, in public stigma, in eco-
nomic hardships, 212 and in deprivation of the freedom to "be with
his family and friends and to form the other enduring attach-
ments of normal life." 213
The eighth amendment right to protection from arbitrary
and unreasonable bail2 14 limits Congress' power to define non-
bailable offenses not unlike the right to vote in federal elections
limiting a state legislature's power to fix voter qualifications. The
Supreme Court has addressed the limits of the state's power to
circumscribe a limited class of voters in Dunn v. Blumstein2 1 5 and
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.216 The issue in Dunn was
whether a durational residence requirement217 for voter registra-
tion violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.2 " At
issue in Harper was the constitutionality of a Virginia poll tax that
determined qualification for voting by wealth.21 9 In each case, the
Court found that, although the right to vote in state elections is
nowhere expressly mentioned in the Constitution, "the right to
vote is a fundamental political right ... preservative of all other
rights. '220 As a result, the grant of such a franchise to the electo-
209. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 274-78 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
539 (1979); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
210. See supra note 40.
211. Some commentators feel that pretrial detainees may be subjected to worse treat-
ment than convicts are. See, e.g., Ervin, supra note 32, at 347; Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial
Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv 641 (1964); Comment, supra note 8, at 244-45.
212. See Frankel, Preventive Restraints and Just Compensation: Toward a Sanction Law of
the Future, 78 YAL LJ. 229, 256-57 (1968) (advocating just compensation for loss of liberty
for individuals under civil detention).
213. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 569 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting, quoting Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482).
214. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
215. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
216. 383 U.S. 663 (1965).
217. 405 U.S. at 332 (voters must be U.S. citizens, state residents for twelve months,
and three months in the county where they sought to vote).
218. Id. at 333 (fourteenth amendment at issue because state action involved).
219. 383 U.S. at 664.
220. 405 U.S. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
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rate prevents the state from drawing lines that are inconsistent
with equal protection requirements.22 The Court emphasized
that it was not questioning the power of a state to impose reasona-
ble restrictions on the availability of the ballot.222 Rather, the con-
cern was that any alleged restrictions imposed by a state would
affect "other basic civil and political rights. ' 223 This concern was
manifested in the requirement that the purpose of the restriction
and the overriding state interest served by it "meet close constitu-
tional scrutiny. "224
By the same reasoning, Congress' imposition of restrictions
on the availability of bail must meet close constitutional scrutiny.
The right to bail, like the right to vote in state elections, may or
may not be implicit in the Constitution but it is so essential to the
preservation of the right to liberty that it may only be impinged in
order to further a compelling government interest.225 Any lesser
standard would allow Congress to deprive individuals of their fun-
damental liberty and the other basic rights which attend, without
due process of law. 26
221. 383 U.S. at 665.
222. Id. at 666.
223. Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 353, 561-62); see also, Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (public education statute limiting access to public schools
violated equal protection requirement); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1972)
(voting statute with durational residence requirement interfered with constitutionally pro-
tected right to travel); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (compulsory
disclosure of NAACP membership lists as required by local tax ordinance would interfere
with members' freedom of association protected by fourteenth amendment).
224. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (quoting Evans v. Cornman, 398
U.S. 419, 422 (1970)).
225. Compare, for example, the holding that although discrimination against a class
based on income has never been recognized as invidious discrimination requiring strict
scrutiny, an income requirement in a voting statute is unconstitutional. Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1965). It is the fundamental right which is ultimately af-
fected by the income-based legislation-in Harper, it was voting, in preventive detention
cases, it is liberty-which gives rise to strict scrutiny. Thus, it is unimportant that "narcot-
ics offenders" is not a class which, itself, gives rise to strict scrutiny. The crucial considera-
tion is that the class is treated differently under legislation which may deprive them of a
fundamental right. Cf. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665; cases cited supra note 223.
226. This result exceeds the constitutional scope of congressional power. See, e.g.,
cases cited supra note 223.
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B. The Goal of Protecting Society from Dangerous Criminals Can be
Achieved Without the Use of the Section 3142(e) Presumption
The section 3142(e) presumption, regarding defendants ac-
cused of federal narcotics offenses, is the mechanism established
by Congress to effect denial of bail.227 This presumption repre-
sents a congressional prediction about that class of criminals and
imposes a burden upon them greater than that imposed upon
other defendants facing pretrial detention for federal offenses. Al-
though Congress' conclusions regarding the narcotics-offender
problem are not without a basis in fact, the propriety of predict-
ing future behavior of accused individuals based on generaliza-
tions regarding a group of convicted criminals leaves much to be
desired. 228 There is also a substantial question as to whether a pre-
sumption favoring detention is the least restrictive means to pro-
tect the community from pretrial recidivism.229
In fact, the 1984 Bail Act itself provides a variety of mecha-
nisms that equally ensure protection of the community, yet with a
less objectionable restriction on individual liberty. Sections
3142(a), (b), and (c) of the Act provide a selection of release con-
ditions that are calculated to eliminate a defendant's criminal ac-
tivity during the pretrial period. When no release conditions ap-
pear to reasonably guarantee the safety of the community, section
227. The legislative history demonstrates that the presumption was created for the
purpose of protecting the community rather than to merely assist judicial decision making:
[t]here is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as
to whom neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the prospect
of revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or
other persons. It is with respect to this limited group of offenders that the
courts must be given the power to deny release pending trial.
1984 S. REP., supra note 3, at 6-7, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3189; "[T]he
Committee believes that judges can, by considering factors such as those [in §§ 3142(g)],
make such predictions with an acceptable level of accuracy." Id. at 9, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 3192; see also cases cited supra note 156-57 (cases where presumption is
outcome-determinative).
228. In establishing this presumption against bail, Congress noted that "It is well
known that drug trafficking is carried on to an unusual degree by persons engaged in con-
tinuing patterns of criminal activity. Persons charged with major drug felonies ... pose a
significant risk of pretrial recidivism." 1984 S. REP'., supra note 3, at 18, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3201.
229. Innumerable empirical studies have demonstrated that current ability to predict
future dangerous behavior, even based on certainty of guilt, necessarily entails a scientifi-
cally unacceptable risk of error. Ewing, supra note 79, at 180-206; Ervin, supra note 34, at
294-95, 311 n.60, 325.
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3142() provides expedited hearing procedures to review the evi-
dence concerning the propriety of detention of an individual de-
fendant. This hearing, prior to a final order of pretrial detention,
is a constitutionally acceptable method for determining when dep-
rivations of liberty are warranted by the public interest, for all of
the procedural protections are in play. Such mechanisms allow for
detention of a defendant when it is necessary for the protection of
the community, yet, they ensure that detention is the result of ac-
tual indications of individual dangerousness rather than genera-
lized predictions regarding a class. Every person who is arrested
upon the basis that some evidence exists to implicate guilt is, if
guilty, a threat to the safety of the community while at liberty.23 0
If suspicion and accusation are sufficient to warrant incarceration,
then a trial after arrest would be an anomaly.
Under the American criminal justice system, a judicial or
quasi-judicial hearing is the accepted method of decision making.
Congressional concerns over the particular dangerousness of a de-
fendant charged with a narcotics crime are adequately protected
by provisions of the Act without the section 3142(e) presumption
for pretrial detention. For example, section 31 4 2(g) allows judges
to consider dangerousness, and equates narcotics crimes with dan-
gerous crimes.2 31 In Schall v. Martin,23 2 the Supreme Court specifi-
cally accepted that pretrial detention based on a prediction of
dangerousness was not, in itself, an unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty without due process of the law. The prediction involved in
such detention could not be unconstitutional as it "forms an im-
portant element in many [judicial] decisions .... ,,233 However, the
inevitable prediction involved in judicial decision making is distin-
guishable from congressional prediction at the most basic level.284
The judicial prediction is based on an evaluation of the evidence
regarding a specific individual, while Congress' prediction is based
on an examination of general probabilities based on general class
characteristics, and influenced by political considerations.2 35
230. See supra note 157.
231. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3 14 2 (g)(1) (Supp. I1 1985).
232. 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984).
233. Id. at 278.
234. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1162-63 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub
nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982).
235. See Comment, supra note 137; see also Ervin, supra note 34, at 292 (criticizing Dis-
trict of Columbia preventive detention statute as simple solution to complex problem, in-
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The section 3142(e) presumption represents an unnecessary
and unconstitutional attempt by Congress to perform the judicial
function in advance, thereby eliminating proper decision making
in pretrial bail determinations. There is no reason to presume
that judges making bail decisions are incapable of considering the
special dangerousness of narcotics offenders.3 6 Judges should be
detaining narcotics offenders based on the same individualized
balancing of considerations that warrant detention of other fed-
eral offenders.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1984 Bail Reform Act represents a major shift from
prior statutory law dealing with pretrial detention. The primary
divergence is in the attitude toward the function of bail in the
criminal process: from assurance that an accused will stand trial to
assurance that the community will be relieved of any threat posed
by an accused in the pretrial period. Several provisions of the Act,
such as explicit directives that unreasonably high bail shall not be
set and that the presumption of innocence is not affected, attempt
to quell concerns about the fairness of the bail reform provisions.
To date, these provisions have proven effective in preserving the
constitutionality of the Act.
However, there is a fundamental unfairness in the Act that
has yet to be directly addressed by the courts. The provisions es-
tablishing an accused's burden of proof at the pretrial hearing
treat individuals differently based on the class of crime charged.
The congressional presumption in section 3142(e) subjects a de-
fendant to a greater burden of proof with respect to the propriety
of release, based on the premise that the defendant falls within a
particular convicted class. This provision may have been intended
by Congress to facilitate judicial fact finding and to act as an addi-
tional weight in the balance for individual bail determinations.
fluenced by politics, public fear, and hysteria); Tribe, supra note 8, at 374 (arguing that
preventive detention is an inexpensive and dramatic but nonetheless ineffective congres-
sional response to public pressure to reduce crime).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (Supp. III 1985) (factors required to be considered identical
to those in § 3142(e)); see, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 617 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.) (recogniz-
ing risks of continued drug activity based on evidence presented), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 962
(1980); United States v. Aiello, 598 F. Supp. 740, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that Con-
gress' conclusions regarding narcotics offenders are "common knowledge").
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However, interpretation of the Act has resulted in judicial use of
section 3142(e) as a directive for detention. The outcome is that
section 3142(e) violates equal protection, in both form and
practice.
If we must accept the principle of preventive detention, a
preferable alternative that will adequately protect the community
from "dangerous" defendants can be found in either the provi-
sions of the District of Columbia Preventive Detention Statute or
the remaining provisions of the 1984 Act. These alternatives do
not eliminate the philosophical or constitutional questions raised
by preventive detention itself, nor do they eliminate the funda-
mental difficulty in determining which persons present a danger
to society. Rather, they assure that even if our system of justice
must shift to incarceration of individuals prior to an adjudication
of their guilt-incarcerating many individuals who not only may
eventually be acquitted, but who also do not represent a danger to
society-such individuals will be evaluated for detention by the
same criteria.
EVAN SHAPIRO
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